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STOCK MARKET VALUE AND DEAL VALUE IN
APPRAISAL PROCEEDINGS
Robert T. Miller*
INTRODUCTION
This Essay considers two methods of valuing public companies in the
context of appraisal proceedings under section 262 of the Delaware General
Corporation Law (DGCL). The first method relies on the efficient capital
markets hypothesis (ECMH) and values the company based on the market
price of its shares before any public disclosure of the possibility of a transaction (the unaffected market price). The second relies on the price that an
unrelated party agrees to pay to acquire the company in a transaction negotiated at arm’s length after a robust sales process by the selling board (the deal
price). Both the unaffected market price and the deal price are determined
by market forces, albeit in different markets: with the unaffected market
price, the relevant market is the stock market generally, while with the deal
price, the relevant market is the market for corporate control. The deal
price is almost always much higher than the unaffected market price, commonly thirty to fifty percent higher.1 Each valuation method raises technical
legal issues under the statutory language of section 262, and although such
issues are often important in appraisal proceedings, I shall largely set them
aside. My purpose is to explore why two different market prices diverge so
significantly and systematically and to determine what in general this implies
for the use of the two prices in Delaware appraisal proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND

ON

DELAWARE APPRAISAL PROCEEDINGS

Section 262 of the DGCL provides that, in certain cases, a stockholder of
a corporation merging with another corporation may refuse to accept the
merger consideration and instead seek appraisal of his shares in the Court of
© 2021 Robert T. Miller. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Essay in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Professor of Law and F. Arnold Daum Fellow in Corporate Law, University of Iowa
College of Law, and Fellow and Program Affiliated Scholar, Classical Liberal Institute, New
York University Law School.
1 BUS. VALUATION RES., CONTROL PREMIUM STUDY: 2ND QUARTER 2020, at 8 (2020).
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Chancery.2 In such cases, the court is required to determine the “fair value”
of the stockholder’s shares on the date of the merger,3 taking into account
“all relevant factors.”4 Under Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., the court may consider
“proof of value by any techniques or methods which are generally considered
acceptable in the financial community and otherwise admissible in court,”5
but the statutory mandate to consider all relevant factors entails that there
may be no presumption in favor of any particular method of valuing the
shares.6 Furthermore, the court is to value the company as a going concern
on a standalone basis7 and then award the shareholder his proportionate
share of that value. Statutory fair value excludes “any element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger,”8 and so the
value of synergies created by the transaction may not be included in the fair
value of the shares, even if the deal price includes value from such synergies.
2 More precisely, under section 262(b), appraisal rights are available for any shares of
stock of a corporation constituent to a merger effected (with a few minor exceptions)
under the DGCL, including long-form mergers under section 251(c), short-form mergers
under section 253, and medium-form mergers under section 251(h), unless the shares fall
into the so-called market exception created by section 262(b)(1)–(2). DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 262(b) (2020). The market exception makes appraisal rights unavailable if, prior to
the transaction, the shares were listed on a national securities exchange (or held of record
by more than 2000 holders) and the holders of the shares are required by the terms of the
merger agreement to accept for such shares anything other than shares of stock of the
surviving corporation, shares of stock listed on a national securities exchange (or held of
record by more than 2000 holders), or cash in lieu of fractional shares. The upshot is that,
when the merger consideration is cash, appraisal rights are always available; such rights are
not available in public-company, stock-for-stock mergers.
3 Id. § 262(a).
4 Id. § 262(h).
5 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983). Prior to Weinberger, Delaware used the so-called Delaware-block method, which computed fair value by ascertaining the asset (i.e., book) value,
market value, and earnings value (i.e., multiple of earnings) of the company, and then
taking a weighted average of results, the relative weights being determined in accordance
with the totality of the facts and circumstances, including the perceived reliability of each
value in the particular case. See EDWARD P. WELCH, ROBERT S. SAUNDERS, ALLISON L. LAND
& JENNIFER C. VOSS, FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 262.10(A)(1)
(7th ed. 2020). See also Paskill Corp. v. Alcoma Corp., 747 A.2d 549, 555–56 (Del. 2000);
Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137, 146–47 (Del. 1980); Tri-Continental Corp. v.
Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 76 (Del. 1950). Unsurprisingly, the results of the block method often
bore little relation to the values contemporary forms of financial analysis would suggest.
For example, in Francis I. duPont & Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 312 A.2d 344 (Del. Ch.
1973), the company’s earnings had been increasing significantly for several years and were
expected to continue to increase in the future. Although the plaintiff urged the court to
compute the earnings value of the company as a multiple of the most recent year’s earnings, the court, adhering to precedent, computed the earnings value as a multiple of the
average earnings over the last five years. Id. at 348–39.
6 DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 363–66 (Del.
2017); Golden Telecom, Inc. v. Global GT LP, 11 A.3d 214, 217–18 (Del. 2010).
7 Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 20 (Del.
2017); Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1144 (Del. 1989).
8 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2020).
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Historically, the Court of Chancery has relied on many different valuation
methods, including the unaffected market price of the company’s shares, the
deal price, discounted cashflow analyses, comparable company analyses, and
comparable transaction analyses.
For many decades, appraisal actions involving public companies were
rare except in related-party transactions. This began to change in the early
2000s with the emergence of appraisal arbitrageurs, i.e., hedge funds, often
founded by plaintiffs’ lawyers, whose investment strategy was to acquire
shares in companies that had announced mergers precisely in order to seek
appraisal for such shares.9 For several years, the appraisal arbitrageurs
enjoyed spectacular returns,10 mostly by convincing the Court of Chancery to
find, on the basis of discounted cash flow analyses, that the fair value of the
company’s shares exceeded the deal price. Such cases produced strong negative reactions from the business community, the corporate bar, and many
academics, and in response the Delaware General Assembly enacted certain
minor changes to the appraisal statute. These changes had little effect,11
however, and appraisal arbitrage reached its apogee in 2016 in In re Appraisal
of Dell, Inc.12 In that case, the court gave no weight to the deal price, even
though it resulted from a months-long, highly publicized sales process conducted, as the court itself concluded, in a way that easily comported with all
applicable fiduciary standards.13 Instead, the court valued the company
using its own discounted cashflow analysis and concluded that, under the
intense glare of the investment community, the directors of one of the largest
companies in the world, assisted by world-class financial advisors, backed up
by the recommendations of the leading proxy-advisory firms,14 and with the
approval of a majority of the unaffiliated shares voting on the merger,15 had
sold the company for more than $6 billion less than its fair value.16 Apparently, that was too much for the Delaware Supreme Court. In a pair of opinions, one reversing the Court of Chancery in Dell17 and the other reversing it
in a similar but less dramatic case, DFC,18 the Delaware Supreme Court came
down strongly in favor of relying on market prices in appraisal cases. In both
decisions, the court remanded to the Court of Chancery, indicating that it
expected that court to enter an award at the deal price.
9 See Wei Jiang, Tao Li & Randall Thomas, The Long Rise and Quick Fall of Appraisal
Arbitrage 3, 5, 12 (Vanderbilt Univ. L. Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper Series, No. 20-16,
2020), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3546281.
10 See id. at 49.
11 See id. at 14–18.
12 C.A. No. 9322, 2016 WL 3186538 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2016), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
177 A.3d at 1.
13 Id. at *29 (stating “the Company’s process easily would sail through if reviewed
under enhanced scrutiny”).
14 Id. at *18.
15 Id. at *19.
16 Dell, 177 A.3d at 37.
17 Id. at 19.
18 DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 351 (Del. 2017).
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DFC, DELL,

AND

But the situation was not quite so simple. In both cases, the Delaware
Supreme Court emphasized that, from an economic point of view, a fair
price is one that a willing seller would accept from a willing buyer, a point
that is equally valid with respect to the unaffected market price and the deal
price. Furthermore, in both cases, although the Delaware Supreme Court
clearly expected the Court of Chancery to enter an award at the deal price, it
first emphasized that the company’s shares traded in an efficient market and
stated that the unaffected market price was evidence of their fair value.19
Although certainly aware that deal prices are generally much higher than
unaffected market prices, the court never mentioned this fact, a fact that has
been the subject of academic debate for decades20 and that is of obvious
importance in appraisal cases.
This omission naturally engendered some confusion. What should the
Court of Chancery do when the company’s shares trade in an efficient market, which suggests that the fair value is the unaffected market price, and the
sales process is robust, which suggests that the fair value is the deal price? A
case involving this question quickly arose. In Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd.
v. Aruba Networks, Inc., the Court of Chancery had to appraise the shares of
Aruba Networks after its acquisition by Hewlett-Packard.21 The shares of the
company had traded in an efficient market prior to the transaction, and
Aruba’s sales process, while imperfect, was fairly robust. Following DFC and
Dell, the Court of Chancery found that the company’s unaffected market
price was evidence of its fair value. Also following DFC and Dell, the court
found that the deal price was also evidence of fair value, at least once it was
corrected to exclude elements of value arising from the merger. Such elements certainly include synergies, and the merger undoubtedly involved significant synergies, some of which Aruba likely captured in the deal price.
Accordingly, relying on synergy estimates prepared by the acquirer and its
consultants, as well as an academic study of the fraction of synergies captured
by targets, the court computed a deal-price-minus-synergies value for the
company.22 The court also thought that elements of value arising from the
merger included reductions in agency costs arising when a public company,
with its diffuse shareholder base, is acquired and its ownership becomes concentrated in a controlling shareholder, who will better monitor management.
But noting that its computation of the synergies impounded in the deal price
was highly uncertain and not even attempting to compute a reduction in
agency costs impounded in that price, the court held that the unaffected
19 Dell, 177 A.3d at 23 n.108, 24; DFC, 172 A.3d at 369.
20 Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? Market Price, Fair Value, and
Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235, 1235 (1990) (collecting sources).
21 C.A. No. 11448, 2018 WL 922139, at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2018), rev’d and remanded,
210 A.3d 128 (Del. 2019).
22 Id. at *44–45.
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market price, which did not involve such uncertainties, was more reliable
evidence of the fair value of the company,23 and it entered an award
accordingly.
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed and remanded with
directions to enter an award at the deal price less synergies.24 Part of its
reasoning was perfectly clear. It stated that reductions in agency costs may
occur when a public company’s diffuse ownership becomes concentrated in a
controlling shareholder such as a private equity fund, but not when, as with
Hewlett-Packard’s acquisition of Aruba, one public company without a controlling shareholder acquires another; in such transactions, one set of diffuse
owners replaces another.25 In any case, any gains from reductions in agency
costs at the target are merely a kind of synergy, and if any existed in this
transaction, they were included in the acquirer’s estimation of synergies.26
This reasoning is very convincing, but it supports nothing more than eliminating from consideration the Court of Chancery’s concern about agency
costs. Indeed, it leaves that court’s concern about the uncertainty of estimating synergies quite untouched. To the extent that the Delaware Supreme
Court responded at all to this point, it argued that, on the facts of the particular case, there was reason to believe that the target and acquirer had material nonpublic information (“MNPI”) about the target’s business that
justified a deal price higher than the unaffected market price.27 Indeed, the
court was able to point to very specific MNPI—an earnings report that would
beat market expectations.28 For this reason, the Supreme Court regarded
the deal price less synergies as a better indication of fair value than the unaffected market price.
Given the holdings of DFC, Dell, and Aruba, and given too that in negotiated transactions targets virtually always share nonpublic information with
acquirers, it may have seemed after Aruba that the deal price (less synergies,
as appropriate) would dominate over the unaffected market price as evidence of fair value. But that impression, too, has proved to be mistaken. In
In re Appraisal of Jarden Corp.,29 as in Aruba, the deal price was considerably
above the unaffected market price and likely impounded significant synergies. Unlike in Aruba, however, the Court of Chancery awarded the dissenting shareholders the unaffected market price. It reached that result because,
after finding that the market for the company’s shares was efficient and so
23 Aruba, 2018 WL 922139, at *53–55.
24 Aruba, 210 A.3d at 142. Mostly for procedural reasons not relevant here, the Delaware Supreme Court adopted an estimate of synergies slightly different from that of the
Chancery Court below.
25 Id. at 133–34.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 138–39.
28 Id. at 139.
29 C.A. No. 12456, 2019 WL 3244085, at *3 (Del. Ch. July 19, 2019), on reargument in
part sub nom. In re Jarden Corp., No. CV 12456, 2019 WL 4464636 (Del. Ch. Sept. 16, 2019),
and aff’d sub nom. Fir Tree Value Master Fund, LP v. Jarden Corp., 236 A.3d 313 (Del.
2020).
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the unaffected market price was reliable evidence of fair value, the court
went on to hold that the target’s sales process was so flawed that the deal
price was not reliable evidence of fair value, making the deal price less synergies the best available evidence of fair value.30 The Delaware Supreme Court
affirmed,31 noting that the Court of Chancery had found that there was likely
no MNPI that could have raised the unaffected market price.32 Consistent
with this focus on MNPI, in In re Appraisal of Stillwater Mining Co., the Court of
Chancery held that there was considerable MNPI known to the target and the
acquirer, and this made the unaffected market price of the target shares
unreliable as evidence of fair value.33 Finding the sales process imperfect but
not fatally so, the court based its determination of fair value on the deal
price. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed.34
What, then, does Delaware law assume about the relation of the unaffected market price when the shares trade in an efficient market and the deal
price when it results from a robust sales process? There seem to be two operative assumptions to explain why the deal price exceeds the unaffected market price. The first is that synergies may be built into the deal price, and here
synergies are construed broadly enough to include any form of value the
acquirer may capture over and above the value of the target on a standalone
basis.35 The second is that the deal price may impound MNPI. Indeed, the
theory coming out of Aruba is that not only does an acquirer in a negotiated
acquisition virtually always get access to MNPI but also that the acquirer is
more likely to discover its true value because it has “a much sharper incentive
to engage in price discovery than an ordinary trader because it [is] seeking to
acquire all shares” of the target and not just a small fraction of them on the
open market.36
Both of these assumptions are no doubt correct in some cases, indeed
even in a great many cases, but it should be clear that there are nevertheless
many cases where neither assumption would apply. In DFC, for example, the
acquirer was a private equity fund and never even argued that synergies were
included in the deal price.37 In Jarden, the court expressly found that there
30 Id. at *2–3.
31 Jarden, 236 A.3d at 316.
32 Id. at 321–22.
33 In re Appraisal of Stillwater Mining Co., C.A. No. 2017-0385, 2019 WL 3943851, at
*57–59 (Del. Ch. Aug. 21, 2019).
34 Brigade Leveraged Cap. Structures Fund Ltd. v. Stillwater Mining Co., 240 A.3d 3, 5
(Del. 2020).
35 See Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., 210 A.3d 128, 134
(Del. 2019).
36 Id. at 140.
37 In re Appraisal of DFC Glob. Corp., C.A. No. 10107, 2016 WL 3753123, at *20 n.230
(Del. Ch. July 8, 2016); see DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346,
367 (Del. 2017). The acquirer in Dell was also a private equity fund, and since neither the
Court of Chancery’s opinion nor the supreme court’s discusses synergies or a reduction in
the deal price because of them, presumably there too the acquirer did not argue that the
deal price impounded any synergies.
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was no MNPI that could have increased the unaffected market price.38 In
cases where neither assumption applies, which is the better indicator of fair
value, the unaffected market price or the (much higher) deal price? To
answer this question, we have to start with the general problem of why, if the
ECMH is correct, corporate acquisitions are commonly concluded at deal
prices so much greater than market prices.
III. COMMON EXPLANATIONS FOR WHY THE DEAL PRICE MAY EXCEED
UNAFFECTED MARKET PRICE

THE

Besides synergies and MNPI, there are several well-known explanations
for deal prices exceeding unaffected market prices. Back in the 1980s, two
common explanations were the misinvestment theory and the market noise
theory.39 According to the misinvestment theory, managers (perhaps
because they enjoy empire building) tend to reinvest the company’s earnings, even when the only available projects have risk-adjusted expected
returns that are below what investors could obtain in the market if the earnings were returned to them.40 Aware of this, rational investors discount the
company’s shares accordingly. The misinvestment theory is thus consistent
with the ECMH: market prices are in fact accurate, given how managers can
be expected to behave. Deal prices are higher than market prices because,
once self-interested managers are replaced, the company will produce higher
cashflows and so really be worth more, a fact reflected in higher deal prices.
The misinvestment theory is thus actually just an agency cost theory; it is a
particular version of the idea, which goes back to Manne,41 that self-interested and shirking managers mishandle the business, and this drives down
the stock price.
The market theory is quite different. On this account, noise traders
sometimes overwhelm rational investors and push down market prices, which
creates an opportunity for an acquirer, who values the company just like
other rational investors, to acquire the company on the cheap.42 On this
theory, market prices are often irrationally low, and deal prices are closer to
the intrinsic value of the company. Nowadays, this theory would usually be
presented in behavioral economic terms: traders, like all human beings, are
subject to various cognitive biases, and these sometimes combine to produce
irrationally low market prices.43 Of course, this account is clearly incompatible with the ECMH, indeed flagrantly so, as it implies that the true value of
an acquired company must be at least a little above the deal price, which is
38 Fir Tree Value Master Fund, LP v. Jarden Corp., 236 A.3d 313, 321–22 (Del. 2020).
39 Reinier Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of “Discounted” Share
Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 891, 892 (1988).
40 Id. at 892, 897–98.
41 See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON.
110, 112 (1965).
42 Kraakman, supra note 39, at 892, 898–99.
43 E.g., Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New
Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 659–60 (2003).
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commonly thirty to fifty percent above the market price. All the evidence in
support of the ECMH,44 as well as all the reasons undermining behavioral
economics generally,45 support discounting such theories.
Another theory, common especially among practitioners, is that while
the unaffected market price is the price of just a single share or small number of shares, the deal price is the price for all the shares, or at least enough
to exercise control, and control has a value of its own. The deal price is thus
higher than the unaffected market price because it includes this control premium. The intuition here is that the bundle of rights associated with a share
of stock can be separated into economic rights, which are the same per share
regardless of the number of shares owned, and control rights, which increase
in value per share with the number of shares owned. But despite the long
pedigree of this idea, it is clearly inadequate, at least standing alone, to
explain why deal prices are higher than market prices. For, if control is valuable, it is not valuable in and of itself,46 but only if it can be monetized in
some way or other. The most obvious way to monetize control is to operate
the business in a manner that produces larger free cashflows than would otherwise have been produced, either through synergies or just more adroit
management, which is really just another form of synergy. The control premium explanation thus collapses into other possible explanations.
Yet another explanation is that acquirers systematically overpay for
targets. Some versions of this explanation attribute the overpayment to the
self-interestedness of acquiring managers (they hope to extract more lucrative compensation packages running a larger company), and others to their
stupidity (they fall victim to optimism bias, and this leads them to overpay).
There is some empirical evidence to support this hypothesis, at least for strategic buyers,47 though it passes credulity that the entire difference between
deal prices and unaffected market prices could be explained in this way.
Like the explanations recognized in DFC, Dell, and Aruba based on synergies and on acquirers having access to MNPI, all of the theories presented
here (even the market noise theory, if we suspend belief in the ECMH) are
likely true in some cases. Moreover, most of the explanations are mutually
compatible, and so in any particular case several of the explanations may be
applicable simultaneously. Clearly, however, in any particular case, not all of
the theories will apply, and often several will not; it is easy to imagine cases
where none would. If these were the only explanations, it seems implausible
44 See generally Jonathan Macey & Joshua Mitts, Asking the Right Question: The Statutory
Right of Appraisal and Efficient Markets, 74 BUS. LAW. 1015 (2019).
45 See generally MARIO J. RIZZO & GLEN WHITMAN, ESCAPING PATERNALISM: RATIONALITY,
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (2020).
46 Except perhaps in highly unusual businesses where the individual in control enjoys
special personal benefits. Conrad Black, for example, famously said that whoever owned
the Telegraph could have dinner with the Queen. See Hollinger Inc. v. Hollinger Int’l, Inc.,
858 A.2d 342, 383–84 (Del. Ch. 2004); see also DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners,
172 A.3d 346, 369 n.118 (Del. 2017).
47 See Ulrike Malmendier, Enrico Moretti & Florian S. Peters, Winning by Losing: Evidence on the Long-Run Effects of Mergers, 31 REV. FIN. STUD. 3212 (2018).
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that deal prices should diverge from unaffected market prices so consistently
and so uniformly. The ubiquity and uniformity of the phenomenon call for
some general explanation that would apply in virtually all cases and in virtually all cases explain a significant excess of deal price over unaffected market
price. As it happens, there is such an explanation.
IV. DOWNWARDLY SLOPING DEMAND CURVES: THE BEST EXPLANATION
The required explanation exists if we assume that, as with other commodities, the demand curve for shares of a company’s stock is downwardly
sloping.48 That is, even when all investors have the same information about a
security, and even if they all value it in accordance with accepted principles
of corporate finance by applying a discounted cashflow model, they will nevertheless tend to reach somewhat different judgments about its value.49 Anyone familiar with real attempts to value a real company knows that the
exercise requires a tremendous number of difficult judgments,50 the results
of which are certainly not dictated precisely by the available information,
with the result that, as Chancellor Chandler famously said, “[t]he value of a
corporation is not a point on a line, but a range of reasonable values.”51 This
is why investment bankers asked to value a company produce not a single
number as the true value but a valuation range that they are prepared to
argue is reasonable.
But if different investors assign different values to a share of stock, then
“the price of a share for purposes of the trading market is established by the
lowest-valuing current shareholder or, stated another way, the highest-valuing potential shareholder.”52 In other words, the market price is the equilibrium price resulting from all market participants valuing the security and
then buying and selling it accordingly. Those who value the security more
highly will buy the security, and those who value it less highly will sell it, the
observed trading price at a given time reflecting a transaction between the
marginal buyer and the marginal seller. As new information hits the market,
all investors will revalue the security in light of the new information, perhaps
revising their estimate of its value, and will then buy or sell accordingly until
a new equilibrium is established.
48 See Richard A. Booth, Discounts and Other Mysteries of Corporate Finance, 79 CALIF. L.
REV. 1053, 1055 (1991); Stout, supra note 20, at 1239.
49 The assumption in the text that different investors value the stock differently can
explain why the market-demand curve for the shares is downwardly sloping. Additional
highly realistic assumptions, such as that investors have limited funds and want to hold
diversified portfolios, can explain why each individual investor’s personal demand curve
for a stock is downwardly sloping.
50 For example, in Dell, just the cashflow projections used in the discounted cashflow
model involved more than 1100 inputs. See Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven
Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 38 (Del. 2017).
51 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. CIV.A. 7129, 2003 WL 23700218, at *2 (Del.
Ch. 2003).
52 Booth, supra note 48, at 1058.
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The assumption that different investors value a security differently
immediately explains why deal prices are consistently much higher than market prices. A purchaser of a small number of shares on the open market
need pay only a price high enough to induce the current shareholder who
values the shares the least to part with his shares. As a purchaser buys more
and more shares, however, he has to offer higher and higher prices to induce
shareholders with higher and higher valuations of the shares to sell.53 A purchaser who wants to acquire the company must offer a price that will induce
at least a majority of the shares to sell, i.e., enough to approve a merger.54
Since the acquirer generally wants to make sure the deal will close, it will
likely be willing to offer a price that will induce a fraction of the shares aggregating considerably more than a simple majority to sell. In other words, the
purchaser of a small number of shares on the open market has to offer a
price that only the marginal shareholder finds attractive. The acquirer of the
company has to offer a price that a large majority of all the current shareholders finds attractive. The deal price will thus, of course, be well in excess
of the unaffected market price.
This entirely realistic, highly intuitive idea was and to some extent still is
controversial.55 Most financial models, including the capital asset pricing
model (CAPM),56 assume that all investors assign the same value to all securities,57 that is, they assume homogenous expectations among investors. This
assumption makes the mathematics involved in such models considerably
simpler, but it is possible to build so-called heterogenous expectation models, and such models have existed for decades.58 Indeed, most models assuming homogenous expectations can be generalized to allow for heterogenous
expectations. The homogenous expectations assumption of the CAPM, for
example, can be relaxed to produce a generalized equilibrium model known
as the popularity asset pricing model (PAPM).59 Moreover, heterogenous
expectation models do well in explaining certain market phenomena that

53 Stout, supra note 20, at 1235–37.
54 For long-form mergers, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 251(c) (2020); for medium-form
mergers, see id. § 251(h).
55 See Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Disagreement, Tastes, and Asset Prices (Ctr.
for Rsch. in Sec. Prices, Working Paper No. 552, Tuck Bus. Sch., Working Paper No.
2004–03, 2005), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/abstract_id=502605.
56 See John Lintner, The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments in
Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets, 47 REV. ECON. & STAT. 13 (1965); William F. Sharpe,
Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FINANCE 425
(1964); see also Stout, supra note 20, at 1239–44.
57 Stout, supra note 20, at 1235–37.
58 See J. Michael Harrison & David M. Kreps, Speculative Investor Behavior in a Stock Market with Heterogenous Expectations, 92 Q.J. ECONOMICS 323 (1978).
59 See Thomas M. Idzorek, Paul D. Kaplan & Roger G. Ibbotson, The Popularity Asset
Pricing Model 2 (Dec. 7, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
abstract_id=3451554).
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traditional models cannot, such as bubbles.60 Critically, heterogenous expectations models generally assume that all investors are acting rationally as well,
even though their rationality is bounded. Even the ECMH has a heterogeneous-expectations version. Under heterogenous expectations, a market is
semistrong informationally efficient if all information is quickly assimilated
by investors, each updating his valuations of securities, and, based on their
updated heterogenous expectations, buyers and sellers quickly establish a
new equilibrium price. Since true fundamental values are unknowable, fundamental value efficiency is always a problematic concept, but assuming heterogeneous rather than homogeneous expectations makes the claim that
securities markets are fundamental-value efficient more plausible rather than
less, for the claim becomes the proposition that the equilibrium price resulting from a large number of informed, rational investors trading each on his
own valuation is likely to be a better estimate of fundamental value than any
one investor’s estimate.
V.

UNAFFECTED MARKET PRICE, DEAL PRICE,

AND

FUNDAMENTAL VALUE

Although the idea that stocks have downwardly sloping demand curves
has been discussed in the law reviews for at least thirty years and in the financial literature for even longer, Delaware courts have never seriously considered this idea, much less its implications for determining fair value in
appraisal proceedings.61 The Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion in Jarden,
however, comes very close. In that case, it was crucial to the court’s holding
that no MNPI existed that would cause the deal price to exceed the market
price. The stockholder argued that such information must have existed
because the insiders and outsiders valued the company differently; the Delaware Supreme Court rejected that argument, saying that although all the parties had all the same information, they nevertheless formed different
opinions based on that information as to the value of the company.62 This is
precisely the heterogeneous expectation assumption.
Let us assume, then, that Delaware courts come to accept the idea that
stocks have downwardly sloping demand curves and this is the primary reason in most cases that the deal price greatly exceeds the unaffected market
60 See José A. Scheinkman & Wei Xiong, Overconfidence and Speculative Bubbles, 111 J.
POL. ECONOMY 1183, 1184 (2003).
61 To my knowledge, the only time Delaware courts have adverted to the idea was in
Mendel v. Carroll, 651 A.2d 297 (Del. Ch. 1994), where Chancellor Allen lists several explanations for the existence of control premia and cites Lynn Stout’s article, see Stout, supra
note 20, for the proposition that control premia may be seen “simply as a function of a
downward sloping demand curve demonstrating investors’ heterogeneous beliefs about
the subject stock’s value.” Mendel, 651 A.2d at 305. The case was not an appraisal action,
however, but concerned whether a board had a duty to dilute a controlling stockholder in
order to accept a premium merger proposal when the controller did not want to sell. Id. at
298.
62 Fir Tree Value Master Fund, LP v. Jarden Corp., 236 A.3d 313, 326–27, 329–30 (Del.
2020).
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price. Does this assumption help us choose between the deal price (or deal
price minus synergies, when appropriate) and the unaffected market price
when both appear to be reliable indicators of fair value?
I begin with the assumption that the value of an asset is how much a
willing seller will accept and a willing purchaser will pay, it being understood
that the value thus established is a point between the seller’s reserve price
and the buyer’s reserve price determined by exogenous factors.63 Combining that assumption with the assumption about downwardly sloping demand
curves and abstracting from cases in which the target holds MNPI shared with
the acquirer yields the following results: Before the acquirer appears on the scene,
the market price results from transactions between willing sellers and willing
buyers of the company’s shares that equilibrate the forces of supply and
demand. Under such circumstances, therefore, the market price is the value
of the shares, for, without an acquirer, all the trades are for relatively small
numbers of shares. Once the acquirer appears on the scene, however, the
acquirer’s willingness to purchase the shares at a higher price than the previous market price represents a huge increase in demand, and so the old equilibrium is disturbed. With demand now higher, a new equilibrium results at
a higher price, the deal price. The acquirer should thus be viewed as just one
more buyer participating in the single market for the company’s shares. The
acquirer differs from other purchasers only in degree, not in kind. In other
words, the unaffected market price and the deal price are prices in the same
market, albeit at different times and under different conditions. Once the
acquirer appears and affects the market, the deal price just is the market
price.
A possible objection to this conclusion is that our pre-theoretic notion of
value implicitly assumes a transaction between a single seller and a single
buyer, which is not the case with the deal price in a public company transaction where there is a single buyer but multiple sellers. On this view, in applying the concept of value in this context we encounter an open-texture
problem.64 This, however, is not the case. Mere multiplicity of sellers does
not, without more, make the concept of value go indeterminate. Consider a
simpler situation—an acquisition of a private company with several shareholders structured as a stock purchase in which each of the shareholders
expressly agrees to sell his or her shares to the acquirer at the same price
63 See DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 368–69 (Del.
2017); see also Huff Fund Inv. P’ship v. CKx, Inc., No. 6844, 2013 WL 5878807, at *1 (Del.
Ch. 2013) (“What is the fair value of an asset? For a simple asset—a piece of real property,
for instance—it is the market value. If a trustee were to sell property held in trust, such a
sale could be challenged by the beneficiary on a number of grounds. It would be odd,
however, if the sale were an arms-length, disinterested transaction after an adequate market canvas and auction, yet the challenge was that the price received did not represent
‘fair’ value.”).
64 See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 80, at 380 (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., 1953); Friedrich Waismann, Verifiability, 19 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y
SUPPLEMENTARY VOLS. 119 (1945), reprinted in LOGIC AND LANGUAGE 117 (Antony Flew ed.,
1955).
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under a single multiparty contract.65 Even if (as would almost always be the
case) the sellers have different reserve prices, we would not hesitate to say
that the deal price in such a transaction is the value of the shares. Hence,
although our notion of value is usually applied in cases where there is a single
seller and a single buyer, that assumption is not critical to the application of
the notion.
What is critical is that the price of identical assets valued by the same
parties be the same. To take an extreme example, imagine that a seller sells
two identical assets, whether shares of stock or some physical assets, to a single buyer in a single transaction, but that the parties agree to different prices
for the two assets. If such a thing happened, we would tend to think that one
or both parties was being irrational, and we would search for some special
explanation. For example, the seller might have had different tax bases in
the two assets and so, after taxes, would have realized different profits on the
two sales; the buyer could have successfully negotiated to share in the greater
profits on the item in which the seller had the higher basis by paying a lower
price for that item. Absent some such explanation, however, we would not
know how to apply our notion of value to the assets in question. Each of the
two prices would have an equal claim to be the value of the assets, and so
neither can be unequivocally thought to be the value of the assets.66
But if what is critical to our notion of value is that the price of identical
assets valued by the same parties be the same, then clearly there is no danger
of the concept breaking down in the context of a corporate acquisition. The
unaffected market price is the value of the shares as determined by one pair
of buyers and sellers, and the deal price is the value of shares at a later time
determined by a different pair of buyers and sellers. As we saw above, the
difference between the unaffected market price and the deal price is just a
change in the market price as market conditions evolve.
All that said, there is one deep reason why there may seem to be a paradox surrounding the discrepancy between the unaffected market price and
the deal price. The paradox concerns the “true” or “real” fundamental value
of a company’s shares over and apart from what anyone takes that value to
be. To see how the paradox rises, recall that we have in this Essay relaxed the
homogeneous expectations assumption, and this makes it perfectly clear that
the price in a transaction between a willing seller and willing buyer is based
on their respective—and generally different—estimates of the fundamental
value of the shares, in particular their beliefs about the present value of the
65 E.g., COMM. ON NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS, AM. BAR ASS’N, MODEL STOCK PURCHASE
AGREEMENT WITH COMMENTARY 1–3 (1995).
66 More commonly, when we observe different parties buying and selling what we take
to be identical assets at different prices, we normally feel that this is to be explained by, for
example, differences between the local markets in which the parties operate, imperfect
knowledge on the part of one or more parties, the presence of subjective values (as
described below in the text), and so on. If all such explanations fail, we think we have
identified an arbitrage opportunity, a genuine irrationality in the market that rational
profit maximizers will exploit.
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future cashflows that an owner of a share will receive. In this context, if we
allow ourselves to start thinking about the “true” or “real” value of the shares
as being the present value of the actual cashflows that will exist in the future,
regardless of what anyone thinks about them today, then there is a clear distinction between this true or real fundamental value and the “values” we read
off transactions in the present. The latter are estimates formed by particular
people about the former, which is a reality existing independent of these
estimates and independent of the beliefs of all human beings.
But now let us for a moment reinstate the homogeneous expectations
assumption, unrealistic as it may be. Under that assumption, everyone’s estimate of the true or real fundamental value is the same. Hence, it is
extremely easy to identify that single estimate with the reality of which it is an
estimate: if, on the basis of the available information, everyone agrees that
the value of a share of the company’s stock is $100 and there is no reasonable
basis for thinking it is anything other than $100 per share, then it is easy to
conclude that the fundamental value of a share just is $100. That is a clear
mistake, of course, and everyone realizes it is a mistake when we remember
that informational efficiency is very different from fundamental value efficiency. Nevertheless, people do sometimes make this mistake, and it is very
easy to fall into the mistake unconsciously. It is similar to the mistake of
confusing a thing with its name, a mistake that no one ever makes with physical objects but that even famous logicians and mathematicians sometimes
make with abstract objects.67 With something as ethereal as the fundamental
value of a security, I think the mistake is very easy to make. That is, just as
mathematicians have sometimes confused the name of an abstract object with
the object itself, I think lawyers and economists have sometimes confused the
single reasonable estimate of the fundamental value of a security with that fundamental value itself. Once made, this mistake will prove fatal. For, if the market price, the only reasonable estimate of the fundamental value, just is the
fundamental value of the security, then how could the deal price ever diverge
from this price? If the deal price diverges from the market price, then it
diverges from fundamental value. When that happens, the mind immediately leaps to explanations involving synergies, MNPI, and so forth, and
when, as often happens, such explanations are patently inadequate, there
appears to be an air of paradox about the deal price being so high—not so
much because it is diverging from the market price of the shares but because
it appears to diverge from the fundamental value of the shares. Any air of
paradox about the divergence of the unaffected market price and the deal
price vanishes, however, when we cease to identify the fundamental value of
the shares with any estimate of that value. This is easy to do when allowing
67 That is, no one ever confuses Jefferson, who was the second President of the United
States and died on the fourth of July in 1826, with “Jefferson,” which is a noun containing
nine letters and a double consonant, but Korzybski confused the number 1 and the
numeral “1” when he argued that “1 = 1” is not strictly true since the first occurrence of the
numeral “1” in the sentence is distinct from the second occurrence. See W.V. QUINE, QUIDDITIES: AN INTERMITTENTLY PHILOSOPHICAL DICTIONARY 231–33 (1987).
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heterogeneous expectations. It is easy to forget to do when assuming homogeneous expectations.
VI. IMPLICATIONS

DETERMINING FAIR VALUE
APPRAISAL PROCEEDINGS

FOR

IN

DELAWARE

So what does this say about determining fair value in Delaware appraisal
proceedings? To be sure, as former Chief Justice Strine said in DFC, “the
definition of fair value used in appraisal cases is a jurisprudential concept,”
by which he meant that it “has certain nuances that neither an economist nor
market participant would usually consider when either valuing a minority
block of shares or a public company as a whole.”68 Key among these nuances
is that the statutory language requires excluding from the fair value of the
shares “any element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation
of the merger” and so the value of any synergies (including any reduction of
agency costs) is impounded into the deal price.69
As Vice Chancellor Laster pointed out in Aruba, however, estimating the
total synergies generated by a business combination is highly uncertain, and
estimating the portion of these synergies captured by the target is even more
uncertain.70 In reversing the Court of Chancery in Aruba, the Delaware
Supreme Court wholly failed to address this point. In reality, although deal
prices are easy to ascertain, deal prices less synergies are not. Unaffected
market prices, however, are always easy to ascertain. Should we not, then,
identify fair value for purposes of section 262 with the unaffected market
price on the basis of judicial convenience, at least when there is no MNPI
that would show that the market price was too low?
That is essentially the argument in a recent article by Macey and Mitts.71
One response is that their concession about MNPI undermines their position. That is, there may be more MNPI in the world than Macey and Mitts
allow,72 and estimating its value is just as difficult as estimating the value of
68 DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 367 (Del. 2017).
69 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 262(h) (2020).
70 See Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., C.A. No. 11448,
2018 WL 922139, at *53–55 (Del. Ch. 2018).
71 Macey & Mitts, supra note 44.
72 Macey and Mitts think cases in which there would be MNPI are rare. Id. at 1038. If
MNPI means clearly articulable facts that are likely to move the market price, as with the
earnings numbers in Aruba, they are correct. But even when such information is not at
issue, there are good reasons that acquirers spend millions of dollars conducting due diligence on materials that targets disclose to them only under confidentiality agreements.
One reason is that, absent such diligence, people often perceive risks that, with greater
information, they become more comfortable discounting (and lower risks mean a higher
price). Another reason is that, in many cases, reaching a complex judgment about future
cashflows requires reviewing not a small number of particularly dramatic facts but a very
large number of mundane ones that could never be disclosed publicly (they would have to
be vetted for Rule 10b-5 purposes), such as reviewing huge numbers of customer contracts.
The idea that, if MNPI exists, a company can simply disclose it to the market, has long
been a dogma of academics, see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of
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the synergies impounded into the deal price. In other words, both deal
prices and market prices are readily observable, but fair value for purposes of
section 262 may be either the deal price minus synergies, with synergies being
hard to estimate, or the unaffected market price plus the value of MNPI, with
the value of MNPI being hard to estimate. Rather than assume that one of
these will generally be easier to compute than the other, why not look at each
case as it arises and see which is easier to compute in that case? Since there
are generally no synergies in private equity deals,73 we could rely on the deal
price in such transactions, just as the Delaware Supreme Court did in DFC
and Dell. In strategic deals, where there are usually significant synergies, we
could rely on the unaffected market price if there was no obvious MNPI
involved, as the court did in Jarden. If there are both synergies and MNPI
involved, the question would become which could be estimated with greater
certainty. Depending on the answer, we could use either the unaffected market price plus the value of MNPI or the deal price minus the value of the
captured synergies.
But if we assume that shares have a downwardly sloping demand curve,
then Macey and Mitts’s argument becomes much more problematic. That is,
if the demand curve is flat, then the explanation for the deal price being
above the market price must lie with synergies or MNPI, and the problem
can be resolved as suggested above. But if the demand curve slopes downward, then even when there are neither synergies nor MNPI, the deal price
will be well above the market price, and awarding the market price will value
the shares based on what the shareholders who value them the least would
take for them, not what shareholders who value them the most would take or
even what the median shareholder would take. In responding to an article
by Choi and Talley,74 Macey and Mitts recognize this and even suggest a way
of trying to uncover the demand schedule for the shares by looking to the
sell orders in the liquidity providers’ order limit book.75 If this gave us a
reasonably complete picture of the demand curve, then we could, as Macey
and Mitts further suggest, compute the weighted average of the values attributed to the shares by the investors holding them and use that value, rather
than the unaffected market price, as the fair value of the shares. This is an
ingenious suggestion, but Macey and Mitts also correctly identify its severe
a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1168 (1981),
but it has always been a fairly absurd one. See Robert T. Miller, The Board Veto and Efficient
Takeovers, 62 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 90, 90 (2014).
73 Macey and Mitts assume that private equity deals generally involve significant reductions in agency costs, some of which are impounded into the deal price, which means that,
just as with synergies in strategic deals, there would almost always be some value difficult to
compute that would have to be deducted from the deal price to attain the fair value of the
shares. See Macey & Mitts, supra note 44, at 1037–38. Given that private equity firms themselves have not usually argued for such reductions in the deal price, this attempt to make
private equity deals relevantly like strategic deals seems strained to me.
74 Albert H. Choi & Eric Talley, Appraising the “Merger Price” Appraisal Rule, 34 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 543 (2018).
75 Macey & Mitts, supra note 44, at 1053–54.
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limitations: limit order data are not generally publicly available, and in any
event, only those shareholders who value the shares at or a little above the
market price are likely to place limit orders.76 The whole point of the exercise was to get at the valuations of shareholders whose valuations of the
shares are well above the market price, and those shareholders are precisely
the ones most unlikely to have placed limit orders to sell.
This leaves us with a conundrum, for as Macey and Mitts observe, there
seems to be no other objective way to get at the demand curve for the shares.
Perhaps an answer lies in the very nature of the appraisal proceeding itself.
That is, the theory behind the appraisal remedy has always been that “the
stockholder is entitled to be paid for that which has been taken from him,”77
which strongly suggests that a stockholder who valued the shares more
should be paid more,78 a point Macey and Mitts accept. But, leaving aside
appraisal arbitrageurs gaming the system, a stockholder who incurs the risk
and expense of bringing an appraisal proceeding does so only because he
honestly believes that the deal price was less than the value of his shares.79
Had he valued the shares at or near the market price, he would have been
delighted with the deal price, which is almost always far in excess of the market price, and he would have simply accepted the merger consideration.
Hence, shareholders bringing appraisal actions have credibly signaled that
they valued the company’s shares much more than market participants generally and even other shareholders of the company. Fair value for them,
therefore, is likely to be higher rather than lower, and so the deal price
minus synergies is very likely a better estimate of the value taken from such
shareholders than is the unaffected market price.
This argument can be recast in terms of heterogeneous expectations:
given the publicly available information, market participants valued the company’s shares and came to different views, with some investors valuing the
shares higher and some valuing them lower. The result of this process was
the unaffected market price, an equilibrium between the investors who valued the shares more than that price and bought and the investors who valued the shares less than that price and sold. The shareholder seeking
appraisal was among the investors who valued the shares more, probably
much more, than the unaffected market price. The acquirer also valued the
shares much more than that price. In a dispute between the shareholder and
the acquirer about the value of the shares, therefore, it makes little sense to
76 Id.
77 Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950).
78 Compare how, in a taking, we should want to compensate the property owner even
for the subjective value he places on the property over and above its fair market value,
provided that we could ascertain that subjective value in an objective manner. See RICHARD
A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 183 (1985).
79 It is possible, of course, that an investor who is not an appraisal arbitrageur could on
occasion choose to play the appraisal arbitrage game and seek appraisal even though he
believed that the deal price was above the fundamental value of the shares. Such a decision would be a departure from the investor’s investment strategy, however, and presumably such cases would be rare.
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set the value at the unaffected market price, a price they agree was far too
low. It is hard to tell how much each party valued the shares, and it is harder
to tell if, had they negotiated a sale, what price, if any, they may have agreed
on. But it is easy to see that the deal price (less synergies, as appropriate) is
likely to be much closer than the unaffected market price to the values that
the parties themselves attributed to the shares.

